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THE EXERCISE OF CONCURRENT INTERNATIONAL




Much has been written about the legal bases of jurisdiction, and
there have been a number of articles criticizing the assertion of juris-
diction in particular cases or in types of cases.' This article will ex-
amine the infrequently treated underlying problem of how a State
which claims jurisdiction should exercise that jurisdiction in a case
where its exercise may conflict with the legitimate jurisdiction of an-
other State. 2
One must start with the basic principle that the territorial
sovereign has jurisdiction in every case. "It is an essential attribute
of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all sovereign independent States,
that it should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within
its territorial limits and in all causes civil and criminal arising within
these limits." 3
 This universally recognized principle of international
* A.B., Princeton University, 1916; LL.B., Harvard University, 1921; Member,
United States Supreme Court, United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Fourth
Circuits, and Massachusetts Bars; Legal Advisor to the U.S. Military Governor of
Germany, 1948-1949; Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, 1956-1960; Former
Chairman, Section on International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion; Lecturer in International Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
1 E.g., Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50
Cornell L.Q. 5 (1964). An extensive and scholarly discussion of the subject is found
in a paper prepared by a distinguished British authority, Dr. F. A. Mann, in which a
number of the decisions questioned herein are criticized by him as exceeding the
jurisdiction of the United States under international law. Mann, The Doctrine Of Juris-
diction in International Law, 1 Recueil des Cours, Academic de Droit International 1
(1964).
2 See also Falk, Jurisdiction, Immunities and Act of State: Suggestions for a Modified
Approach, in Essays on International Law (1961).
3 Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S.S. "Cristina" [1938] A.C. 485, 496-97. This
principle has been described by Mr. Justice White as "the deeply imbedded postulate
in international law of the territorial supremacy of the sovereign, a postulate that has
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law is the foundation upon which all jurisdictional doctrine must be
built. Broadly speaking, conflicts arise because other legal principles
permit a State legitimately to exercise jurisdiction in cases involving
acts committed or situations existing in the territory of another State.
Since that other State has jurisdiction as the territorial sovereign, two
different States might claim jurisdiction over the same situation.
Those jurisdictional principles which might lead to such a conflict and
which are pertinent to this discussion are the following:
1. A State has jurisdiction when a constituent element of an
offense took place within its territory. This controversial principle,
erroneously referred to at times as the "effects doctrine," is frequently
invoked by the United States?
2. A State may subject a national to its laws wherever the na-
tional himself may be. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the
Supreme Court, clearly announced that an American citizen living
abroad "continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue
of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority
over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a
foreign country." 5
3. A ship has the nationality of the State whose flag it flies .° Con-
sequently, while a ship is on the high seas the flag State has exclusive
jurisdiction over it and over those on board.' When the ship is within
the territorial waters of a foreign sovereign, the flag State can exercise
jurisdiction with respect to "all matters of discipline and all things
done on board which affected only the vessel or those belonging to
her"—sometimes referred to as the "internal affairs" of the ship—
provided that these matters "did not involve the peace or dignity of
the country, or the tranquillity of the port.'
4. Personal jurisdiction over a party may be employed to order
the party to act or to cause action in the territory of another State.°
been characterized as the touchstone of private and public international law." Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 445-46 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
4 [T]he courts of many countries ... which have given their criminal legislation
a strictly territorial character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offences,
the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another
State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national
territory, if one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially
its effects, have taken place there.
The S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 23 (1927).
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932).
6 Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958 [1962] 13 U.S.T. & 0.I.A. 2312, art. 6.
7 Ibid. See also Boczek, Flags of Convenience 157-58 (1962).
8 Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887). In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963), the Court referred to "the well-estab-
lished rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the
internal affairs of a ship," citing Wildenhus's Case.
9 Other bases of jurisdiction, not pertinent to the present discussion, are the "protec-
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The last situation differs from the first three, because in this fourth
situation a tribunal issues an ad hoc order to bring about certain ac-
tion abroad, whereas in the other situations general legislation is made
applicable to foreign acts. In all four situations, however, there may
be a conflict with foreign law or policy.
How can these conflicts be avoided? Certain situations may be
governed by a treaty giving one or the other State "primary" juris-
diction." Even in the absence of such a treaty, some foreign authori-
ties take the position that a State may not exercise its jurisdiction in
a way that would infringe upon the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign, and there is some indication in cases that certain of our
own courts share this view. This position would certainly minimize
unfortunate conflicts and may well become accepted as the rule." On
the other hand, the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
(hereinafter the Restatement) takes the view that jurisdiction is a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty, that a State's sovereignty can-
not be limited by dogma unless the principle is widely accepted and
firmly established, and that there is no principle of law so accepted
and established denying a State the exercise of its legitimate jurisdic-
tion, even though such exercise may conflict with the jurisdiction of
another sovereign." Accepting the Restatement concept as indicative
of the present state of our law, the problem to which this article is
addressed is what should be done in practice to alleviate or eliminate
the conflicts and hardships that can arise as a result of the exercise of
conflicting international jurisdiction.
The problem straddles two disciplines—political science and
law—but it has been discussed far more often in legal circles. Quite
frequently it arises in the area of antitrust. A number of other countries
have antitrust laws and policies diametrically opposed to ours and
permit, encourage, or even require that which this country prohibits.
tive principle," Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 948 (1961), and the "universality principle," Attorney-General v. Eichmann, Dist.
Ct. Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, Dec. 11, 1961, reported in Oliver, Judicial
Decisions, 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 805, 808-11 (1962). Both of these principles are recognized
and followed by the United States. In addition, some other States follow the "passive
personality principle." See Ebb, Regulation and Protection of International Business
82-84 (1964). For examples of even more extreme doctrines, see Lenhoff, supra note I,
at 7. These doctrines are not considered legitimate bases of jurisdiction by the United
States.
10 E.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
1792, art. VII, § 3. A solution involving congressional rather than treaty action was
proposed by the Working Group on Antitrust Policy in International Trade of the
Committee on International Trade and Investment, Section of International and Compara-
tive Law, American Bar Association. 1963 Proceedings, Sect. Intl & Comp. L., ABA 70.
11 See Oppenheim, International Law § 128 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); Mann,
Anglo-American Conflict of International Jurisdiction, 13 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1460 (1964).
12 Restatement § 37, comment a (1965); id. § 39, comment b.
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Therefore, when the United States tries to extend its antitrust laws
to render "illegal" acts which were committed abroad—often acts of
foreign nationals committed in their own country—the seeds of a seri-
ous conflict may have been sown. This subject was the focal point of a
widely discussed report given by a committee of the International Law
Association at its Tokyo Conference in 1964. 13 The resolution which
was finally adopted by the Association on this subject affirmed that
"the actions of States in this field are subject to rules of international
law." Significantly, however, it requested its committee not only to
define the applicable rules of law but also to recommend "practical
methods for eliminating, reducing or resolving conflicts between
States arising out of the extraterritorial application of such legisla-
tion."" The International Law Association wisely stressed the practical
in seeking a workable solution.
The American Law Institute, on the other hand, has stated its
solution, or partial solution, as a principle of law, set forth in black
letter dogma. Section 40 of the Restatement provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require incon-
sistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is
required by international law to consider, in good faith, mod-
erating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the
light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that in-
consistent enforcement actions would impose upon
the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take
place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either
state can reasonably be expected to achieve compli-
ance with the rule prescribed by that state. (Em-
phasis added.)
It is an underlying premise of this provision that both States
have jurisdiction. Section 37 of the Restatement declares that "a state
having jurisdiction . . . may exercise [it] . . . notwithstanding the
fact that another state also has jurisdiction, except as otherwise
13 Report of Fifty-First Conference, Intl L. Ass'n 348 (Tokyo 1964).
14 Id. at xxix. The corresponding resolution, adopted in 1966, asked the committee
to propose "new techniques or procedures for the avoidance or resolution of such
disputes." Advance Report by the American Branch of the Resolutions Adopted at the
Fifty-Second Conference, Int'l L. Ass'n 5 (Helsinki 1966).
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provided by the rules stated in § 40. . . ." This seems to mean that a
State which has jurisdiction may exercise it only if it complies with
the legal rules set forth in section 40; that if a State fails "to consider,
in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction,
in the light" of the enumerated factors, it has violated section 40,
and is, therefore, exercising its jurisdiction illegally. Since a right of
the other State is thus infringed, the latter has an international claim
which could be prosecuted through diplomatic or perhaps legal channels
against the offending State. Such a result is, to say the least, extremely
novel. No authority is cited to support this approach. The cases re-
ferred to in the Reporters' Notes on the section deal with considera-
tions of comity, fairness, and practicality rather than law. It would
seem more in accord with the precedents of international law and the
realities of international relations and judicial procedures to say, not
that "each state is required by international law" to give consideration
to such matters, but that each State should consider them, in the inter-
ests of maintaining harmony in international relations, preventing
unjust hardship on parties, and avoiding the futile and injudicious act
of issuing unenforceable orders.
Regardless of whether section 40 should state law or reflect
practical policy, its enumeration of the factors to be considered seems
woefully deficient. Although it mentions the need to consider whether
there will be hardship on a party and whether the desired result can
be achieved, it fails to require consideration of the broad problem of
whether there will be possible international complications arising from
the infringement of another's sovereignty. Section 40 speaks only of
two peripheral aspects of the problem—the nationality of the person,
and the place where an act to be required in the future will take place.
True, it allows consideration of whether the vital national interests
of the State are involved, but this would be a very rare case indeed.
Furthermore, section 40 deals only with the situation where two States
impose conflicting requirements of law. The problem is just as real,
however, when a statute or a judicial decision of State A declares
illegal an act done in State B by a national of State B that was per-
fectly legal there and quite possibly encouraged by State B at the
time it was done, even though it may not have been required by law.
There is yet another facet that has been overlooked in the drafting
of section 40. A state may have certain deeply rooted policies or
customs, infringement of which can touch a sensitive nerve of the
sovereign and cause perhaps a more severe reaction than infringement
of its law.
The approach to be followed in this article involves an examina-
tion and analysis of situations that have arisen in the past, in order
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to see what considerations influenced the decision makers in exercising
their discretion and, in some cases, what considerations should have
influenced them. The techniques used to try to avoid conflict will be
noted, and their effectiveness discussed. The philosophy and rationale
of the decision, rather than the actual holdings, will be stressed. On the
basis of such analysis, suggestions will be made as to the most appro-
priate and practical solutions to the problem.
In considering the situations presented below, two points should
be borne in mind. First, the discussion will not involve choice-of-law
problems or other matters within the realm of conflict of laws. In
choice-of-law questions, the issue is whether the laws of one jurisdic-
tion or those of another should be applied to govern the disposition of
the case. In the cases to be discussed hereafter, the law to be applied,
if any is to be applied, is American law, and the issue is whether, and
how, to apply it. Second, except as otherwise made clear by the context,
references to jurisdiction do not relate to "personal" jurisdiction over
a party in order to adjudicate a dispute, but rather to "legislative"
jurisdiction to apply our law or orders to a particular act or situation."
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF STATUTES
A. Military Base Cases'°
In successive terms, the Supreme Court adopted two contradictory
approaches to the question of whether local legislation which limited
the working hours of laborers should be applied to our military bases
located abroad. The two approaches demonstrate the contrasting
philosophies which have persisted in our courts to the present day, one
of which tends to provoke international repercussions, while the other
deliberately avoids them.
Fermi/yrs-Brown Co. v. Conner raised the question whether the
requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which provided for maxi-
mum hours of work in interstate and foreign commerce,' applied to
labor on our military base at Bermuda. The act expressly applied to
the commerce of "any . . . possession of the United States.' The
narrow , question required the construction of the word "possession,"
15 Restatement § 7(2) states: "A state does not have jurisdiction to enforce a rule
of law prescribed by it unless it had jurisdiction to prescribe the rule." It is in the sense
of "jurisdiction to prescribe the rule" (i.e., "legislative jurisdiction") that the term
"jurisdiction" is generally being used herein, as distinguished from jurisdiction over a
party (i.e., "personal jurisdiction"). As to the latter, see von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 (1966).
le See generally Green, Applicability of American Laws to Overseas Areas Con-
trolled by the United States, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1955).
17 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
18 '52 Stat. 1063 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1964).
79 52 Stat. 1061 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1964).
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but the broader question was whether Congress meant to extend the
standards of the act to labor employed on military bases abroad. The
lease of the base in question had given the United States "all the rights,
power and authority within the Leased Areas which are necessary for
the establishment, use, operation and defence thereof, or appropriate
for their control. . . 2' 2° At the time of the enactment of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Congress had not considered its application to
our overseas military bases. In the absence of any discernible con-
gressional intent in this matter, the Court reached the unnecessary and
unfortunate conclusion that "it is difficult to formulate a boundary
to [the act's] . . . coverage short of areas over which the power of
Congress extends. . . ." 2 '. It held that the Bermuda base should be
deemed a "possession" of the United States, and that the act applied
there.22
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a strong dissenting opinion in which
three other Justices joined. In his dissent, he contended that the United
States had not acquired, in Bermuda, "such responsibilities as would
require us to import to those islands our laws, institutions and social
conditions beyond the necessities of controlling a military base."'
The following year, the Court had a very similar case, but used a
different and much wiser approach. Foley Bros. v. Filardo' raised the
question whether the Eight Hour Law applied to work done on Ameri-
can military bases in Iraq and Iran pursuant to a contract of the
United States. This law provided that "every contract to which the
United States ... is a party . . . shall contain" provisions specifying
an eight-hour working day." In holding that the Eight Hour Law did
not apply to contracts for work in those areas, the Court used a very
significant approach.
The canon of construction which teaches that legisla-
tion of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States . .. is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congres-
sional intent may be ascertained. It is based on the assump-
tion that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic con-
ditions. We find nothing in the Act itself, as amended, nor in
the legislative history, which would lead to the belief that
20 55 Stat. 1560 (1941).
23 335 U.S. at 389.
22 The case treated the statute as regulating the actions of our citizens as employers
when abroad as well as here, even though those employed and controlled by the act might
be aliens. Id. at 381.
23 Id. at 394.
24 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
25 Eight Hour Law, ch. 174, 37 Stat. 137 (1912).
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Congress entertained any intention other than the normal one
in this case. . . .
... An intention so to regulate labor conditions which are the
primary concern of a foreign country should not be attributed
to Congress in the absence of a clearly expressed purpose."
The Court distinguished Vermilya-Brown, noting that it only involved
construction of the term "possession." Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
a concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Jackson, in which he said
that Vermilya-Brown should be overruled. He noted that in an applica-
tion for rehearing of that case, the Secretary of the Army had pointed
out that a number of countries had a scale of maximum wages with
which our minimum-wage scale might well conflict.'
In Vermilya-Brown, therefore, the Court had adopted an approach
which, by importing American labor standards into a British Crown
Colony where labor conditions and policies were entirely different, had
created the danger of international complications. Foley Bros., on the
other hand, took the view that congressional legislation is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States un-
less a contrary intent is evident. In particular, as that case clearly
indicates, courts should not impute to Congress an intent to extend
our own social and economic legislation to control aliens in foreign
territory.
B. Seamen's Acts Cases'
Although the Seamen's Acts cases are not new, they are presented
here because they state principles which should have been followed
later in other areas. They involve the question whether these statutes
applied to foreign vessels in our ports, and whether they were in-
tended to affect transactions which had occurred prior to the ship's
28 336 US. at 285-86. As the Secretary of State said only a year or two ago: "We
have neither the authority nor the power—and I hope not the desire—to regulate the
affairs of the rest of the world." Address by Dean Rusk, George Washington University,
52 Dep't State Bull. 1030, 1031 (1965).
27 A third case involving our military bases overseas arose the same year. United
States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949), raised the question whether our Newfoundland base
was a "foreign country" for the purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60
Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), which excluded from
its coverage claims arising in a "foreign country." The Supreme Court, while refusing
to overrule Vennilya-Brown, distinguished it by saying that that case "postulates that
the executive agreement and leases effected no transfer of sovereignty," 338 U.S. at 221,
and it held that the Newfoundland base was a foreign country. It thus confirmed
that Vermilya-Brown had imported our labor legislation into a foreign country having
a different sovereignty. Again Justices Jackson and Frankfurter wrote concurring opinions
castigating the Court for its position in Vermilya-Brown.
28 On the subject of application of our laws to foreign ships and their personnel,
see generally Raymond, The Application of Our Laws to Foreign Merchant Ships, 67
Dick. L. Rev. 289 (1963).
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entry there. As noted above,' it has been the practice, if not the
law, for the territorial sovereign to refrain from exercising jurisdiction
over such vessels when the matter related only to the internal affairs
of the ship. "A merchant vessel . . . is deemed to be a part of the
territory of [the flag State] . when in navigable waters within the
territorial limits of another sovereignty,' even though the territorial
sovereign may exercise its own jurisdiction if disturbances on the vessel
affect the peace of the port.
The Dingley Act at one time contained the following provisions:
(a) It shall be ... unlawful in any case to pay any sea-
man wages ... in advance of the time when he has actually
earned the same.... [Such payment] ... shall in no case ...
absolve the vessel . . . from full payment of wages after the
same shall have been actually earned. . . . (e) This section
shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the
United States. . . . 31
In Patterson v. Bark Eudora," this section was held applicable, be-
cause of its express language, to a British ship which was advancing
payments to seamen in one of our ports. However, in Sandberg v.
McDonald," when a seaman on a foreign vessel had received an
advance abroad, according to his contract, and tried to collect the
amount again here, the Court significantly rejected the claim:
Conceding . . . that Congress might have legislated to annul
such contracts as a condition upon which foreign vessels
might enter the ports of the United States, it is to be noted,
that such sweeping and important requirement is not found
specifically made in the statute. Had Congress intended to
make void such contracts and payments a few words would
have stated that intention, not leaving such an important
regulation to be gathered from implication.'
Thereafter Congress amended the statute to provide that advance
payment of wages, "whether made within or without the United
States," should not absolve the vessel from full payment of the wages
after they were earned." Nevertheless, in Jackson v. S.S. "Archi-
29 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
no United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1933).
31 Dingley Act § 10, 23 Stat. 55, 56 (1884), 46 U.S.C. § 599(a), (e) (1964).
32 190 U.S. 169 (1903).
33 248 U.S. 185 (1918).
at Id. at 195. For a case where such a condition was written into the statute, see
Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920). See also Bickel, Strathearn S.S. Co. v.
Dillon—An Unpublished Opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 69 Marv. L. Rev. 1177, 1179
(1956).
35 41 Stat. 1006 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 599(a) (1964).
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medes," the Court, again refusing to apply the act to foreign vessels
for advances made abroad, stated: "The amendment . . . made no
reference whatever to foreign vessels;—left unchanged and in full
force all of paragraph (e) which ... as held in the Sandberg case, indi-
cated that the prohibition ... was intended to apply to foreign vessels
only while in waters of the United States . . . ." 3° Once again there
was a movement to amend the act further to cover the point, but there
was "a storm of diplomatic protest," and the bill was killed.' There
is clearly a limit of tolerance beyond which other nations will offer
protest and, possibly, retaliation when the United States tries to ex-
tend its laws to situations deemed by those nations to be more properly
within their own jurisdiction.
In Seamen's Acts cases where the legislative intent was unmis-
takably clear, the courts applied the acts to foreign vessels which were
in our ports. Quite properly, however, they have resisted any inter-
pretation which extended the coverage of the acts to matters arising
abroad unless it was required by the unambiguous language of the
statute. It has become clear that when there is an extension, or
threatened extension, of United States jurisdiction to matters that not
only are within the jurisdiction of another State but which that State
believes are of primary concern to it, such action or proposed action
can disturb international relations and result in diplomatic protests
and other pressures in resistance.
C. Prohibition Act Cases
The National Prohibition Act proscribed "transportation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes.. . ."" In Cunard S.S.
Co. v. Mellon," it was held that this provision made it illegal for
foreign ships to enter our territorial waters and ports if, as was
customary, they carried liquor to be sold or dispensed to passengers
and crew or as cargo for other ports, though concededly it could
not be sold, dispensed, or unloaded within our jurisdiction. This
decision provoked a flood of diplomatic protests. As the only maritime
State with a prohibition policy, the United States was inevitably at
odds with the rest of the international maritime community when it
forbade their ships to enter our waters with liquor on board. The
matter was finally resolved by a series of treaties with the countries
involved, treaties which contained provisions permitting their vessels
36 275 U.S. 463, 470 (1928).
37 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 146 (1957).
38 National Prohibition Act § 1, 40 Stat. 1050 (1917).
39 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
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passing to or from our ports, or passing through our territorial waters,
"to have on board alcoholic liquors listed as sea stores or as cargo
destined for a foreign port, provided that such liquor is kept under seal
while within the jurisdiction of the United States."' Such treaties, of
course, superseded any prior inconsistent provisions."
Two comments seem warranted. In the first place, Congress should
have been sensitive enough to have anticipated the foreign reaction,
and should have made a specific exception similar to that later in-
corporated in the treaties. This would have in no way infringed upon
the purposes to be achieved. Second, the Court in Cunard should have
found a way to avoid this interference with the internal affairs of a
foreign ship. As the dissenting Justice stated:
[I]nterference with the purely internal affairs of a foreign
ship is of so delicate a nature, so full of possibilities of inter-
national misunderstandings and so likely to invite retalia-
tion that an affirmative conclusion in respect thereof should
rest upon nothing less than the clearly expressed intention of
Congress to that effect, and this I am unable to find in the
legislation here under review.'
D. Antitrust Cases'
The earliest significant case in the antitrust field is the famous
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.," in which the opinion of
the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Holmes. The parties were
competing American corporations. The Sherman Act rendered illegal
"every contract ... in restraint of trade or commerce . . . with foreign
nations." 45 In holding that it was inapplicable to the acts of the
defendant in Costa Rica, the Court made this very important pro-
nouncement:
In the first place the acts causing the damage were done, so
far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States
and within that of other states.
• • • •
[While civilized] ... countries may treat some relations
42 See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118 (1933). See also [19231 1 Foreign
Re. U.S. 133 (1938) ; 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 674-79 (1940).
41 Cook v. United States, supra note 40, at 118-19.
42 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, supra note 39, at 133 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
43 For an excellent treatment of this subject, see generally Brewster, Antitrust and
American Business Abroad (1958). For another excellent book, giving the Government's
position, by one having had long experience with the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, see Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws (1958). For a
more complete bibliography of works dealing with the extraterritorial application of
our antitrust laws, see Report, supra note 13, at 492.
44 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
45 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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between their citizens as governed by their own law, and keep
to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive
. the general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country where the act is done. . . For
another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the
actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than
those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be
unjust, but would an interference with the authority of an-
other sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the
other state concerned justly might resent.
. . . .
The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt
to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined
in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which
the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. "All legis-
lation is prima facie territorial.'""
Granted that Mr. Justice Holmes oversimplified the case when
he rather casually disposed of jurisdiction over nationals by calling
it "the old notion of personal sovereignty," his approach to the problem
of statutory construction was nevertheless very sound. The rule he
applied—that "all legislation is prima facie territorial"—had been
established almost a century earlier in The Apollon,47 and had also
been used in Foley Bros. It is a salutary rule that is easy to apply.
It is sound and logical and is flexible enough to permit appropriate
exceptions. Why it has not been universally adopted as the starting
point in the construction of statutes is difficult to understand.
Two years after American Banana, in United States v. American
Tobacco Co.,' the Court held that the Sherman Act applied to an
American company which had made a restrictive agreement abroad
with foreign companies. With no discussion of the issue, the Court
applied the act extraterritorially. This apparent departure from
American Banana deserved careful consideration and discussion by
the Court. The lack of this discussion can only be attributed to a
failure of counsel properly to stress the point and to oversight on
the part of the Court. It leaves an unfortunate gap in the development
of our antitrust doctrines.
46 213 U.S. at 355-57.
47 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). The Court there stated: "The laws of no nation
can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens
And however general and comprehensive the phrasei used in our municipal laws may
be, they must always be restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon whom
the legislature have authority and jurisdiction." Id. at 370.
48 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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Extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act was confined to
agreements of our own nationals until 1945." In that year, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,' which represents the extreme limit to which the courts have
gone in applying our statutes extraterritorially. It is submitted that
there was no legitimate basis for the assertion of jurisdiction;" how-
ever, for the present it shall be assumed that there was the necessary
jurisdiction, and attention will be focused on the question whether the
court wisely exercised its discretion when it construed the Sherman
Act so as to encompass the Alcoa case.
The Alcoa decision held a foreign corporation responsible for
contracts, made abroad with other foreign corporations, which es-
tablished for each contracting party a production quota for the alumi-
num it would produce abroad. The court justified its action on the
ground that the production quotas were intended to affect and did
affect our import trade.' The decision applied the statute to foreign
corporations acting abroad, even though such corporations are not
mentioned in the act. This contrasts sharply with the Sandberg and
Jackson cases discussed above, where the statutory provision ex-
pressly applied to "foreign vessels" but was construed as governing
such vessels only while within our territorial jurisdiction.'
40 For a review of the antitrust cases involving a foreign aspect up to 1945, see
Oseas, Antitrust Prosecutions of International Business, 30 Cornell L.Q. 42 (1944).
50 148 F.2d 416, 439-45 (2d Cir. 1945) (on certification from the United States
Supreme Court for failure of quorum of qualified Justices). 	 •
51 See Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 Am. J. Int'l L.
558 (1967).
52 It seems very doubtful that Congress, at the time of the enactment of the
Sherman Act, gave any thought to whether the act should be applied to acts of foreign
corporations committed abroad. See Dean, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust
Laws, 1957 Proceedings, Sect. Int'l & Comp. L., ABA 43, 49. In interpreting the act
on this point, the Alcoa court said:
[T]he only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability,
and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of the
United States, we cannot look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it is quite
true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without
regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise
of their powers ... . We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish
all of whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within
the United States . . . On the other hand, it is settled law—as [the de-
fendant] . . . itself agrees—that any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends . . . Almost any
limitation of the supply of goods in Europe . . . may have repercussions in
the United States if there is trade between the two . . . . [W]e shall assume
that the Act does not cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports
or exports, unless its performance is shown actually to have had some effect
upon them.
148 F.2d at 443-44. The court also said that the agreements "were unlawful, though
made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them." Id. at 444.
53 See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
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There was no American party involved in this aspect of the case,
and no act took place within our territory, as the court stated the
case. There was not even a positive effect in this country, but only a
possible negative effect—a potential failure to have as much aluminum
shipped here by the defendant and those with whom it had contracted
as might otherwise have been voluntarily shipped. This, of course, was
a situation in which we could not require any shipment of aluminum.
It would seem that there could not be a more obvious case of reaching
out to deal with a matter that was clearly of primary interest to other
States—those States where the agreements were made, those States
where they were to be performed and where the limitation on produc-
tion brought about by the quotas would become effective, and those
States of which the parties to the agreements were nationals. In all
those States, the agreements were perfectly legal and enforceable.
The American Tobacco case had started the departure from
the sound precedent of American Banana. By employing the unfortu-
nate philosophy of Vermilya-Brown, Alcoa greatly extended this de-
parture and interpreted the antitrust laws as applying to matters
obviously reached only at the most extreme limits of our legitimate
legislative jurisdiction if not, as many believe, beyond them. The
wisdom of so doing was, to say the least, very dubious.
There is a further objection to an exercise of jurisdiction based,
as it was, solely on the claim of adverse effect on our foreign com-
merce. In this world of competitive international trade, there is seldom
anything that benefits the commerce of one country that does not ad-
versely affect the commerce of another. Something more than merely
an adverse effect upon our foreign commerce should be shown if our
laws are to govern extraterritorial activities of a foreign corporation.
It should be remembered that if this country establishes such a
principle, it can be invoked by other countries against us."
Assume that an American company which had previously been
shipping certain goods to Canada, among other countries, made a con-
tract to increase its production of such goods and ship all of its output
to a concern in Germany—an act which would be beneficial to our
foreign commerce, and a contract which was perfectly legal both in
this country and in Germany. How would this country react to a decree
of a Canadian court ordering the American company, over which it had
secured personal jurisdiction, to cancel the contract, assigning as its
reason the fact that the transaction adversely affected the foreign
commerce of Canada? The doctrine in the Alcoa case would justify
foreign legislation subjecting United States nationals to criminal and
civil liabilities for such adverse effects. This country could well fall
54 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
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victim to an unwise, if not unsound, legal doctrine of its own making."
Fortunately there were no serious international repercussions from
Alcoa, but it served as the precedent for extreme applications of our
antitrust laws in later cases, some of which instigated strenuous objec-
tions by foreign governments. United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc.56 was an antitrust suit based on
contracts between Swiss corporations and other foreign corporations,
made and to be performed in Switzerland and other European coun-
tries. The Swiss Government, as amicus curiae, made the following
representations in the case:
This case is of utmost concern to the Swiss Confedera-
tion. The attempt is here being made to apply the anti-trust
laws of the United States to hold illegal action taken (a) in
Switzerland, (b) at the behest and with the encouragement
of the Swiss Confederation and in conformity with Swiss law,
(c) by the Swiss watch industry, (d) which is both govern-
ment regulated and affected with a public interest. This action
of the Swiss watch industry does not discriminate in any
way against the United States and is not aimed only at the
United States; rather this action affects the world at large.
The attempt is also being made to apply the anti-trust laws
to hold illegal contracts (a) made by the Swiss watch in-
dustry with watch manufacturers in Great Britain, France
and allegedly in Germany and (b) which do not involve any
performance in the United States.
. 	 . 	 .
55 Cf. Restatement § 18, illustration 8. The German Cartel Law, which became
effective on January 1, 1958, provides in § 98(2): "[T]his law applies to all restraints
of competition, which have effect within the area to which the law applies, even if they
are caused from outside of such area." Report, supra note 13, at 447. It appears that
our Alcoa doctrine may already have been invoked by another sovereign in a way that
might well plague us.
Perhaps it is significant that Alcoa was decided in 1945, and that a mere three years
later the Supreme Court decided Vermilya-Brown. There seems to have existed in that
immediate post-war period a judicial approach to statutory construction that invoked
the literal interpretation of the words used; if there were no exceptions spelled out, it
was assumed that Congress intended to exert its power to cover the greatest area
legally possible. Perhaps this approach was the result of efforts by the courts to construe
the war-time powers of the President and the Congress. Their attention had been focused
on the extent to which governmental powers could be carried, rather than on the
normal peace-time exercise of them. As already noted, in 1948, probably because of
second thoughts on the question, the Supreme Court in Foley Bros., though confronted
with statutory language fully as broad as that of the Sherman Act (the Sherman Act
said that "every contract . .. in restraint of trade" was illegal; the Eight Hour Law
said that "every contract . . . to which the United States is a party" shall contain
certain provisions), nevertheless returned to the principle of American Banana, that
legislation is prima fade territorial. But'Alcoa and Vermilya-Brown have not yet been
expressly overruled.
66 1963 Trade Cas.	 70600 (S.D,N.Y. 1962).
687
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Such application, among other things, would infringe
Swiss sovereignty, would violate international law and would
be harmful to the international relations of the United
States.'
The court's reaction to this can be seen in the following extract:
If, of course, the defendants' activities had been re-
quired by Swiss law . .. an American court would have
... no right to condemn the governmental activity of another
sovereign nation. In the present case, however, the defend-
ants' activities were not required by the laws of Switzerland
. . . . In the absence of direct foreign governmental action
compelling the defendants' activities, a United States court
may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and contracts abroad,
if, as in the case at bar, such acts and contracts have a sub-
stantial and material effect upon our foreign and domestic
commerce.'
The act-of-State doctrine prohibits our courts from examining
the validity of acts taken by a foreign government within its territory."
It "rests . . . upon the highest considerations of international comity
and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign
State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of an-
other would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between
governments and vex the peace of nations.' "" Whether the acts were
taken by, were required by the law of, were taken at the behest of, or
even if they were merely encouraged and regulated by the foreign
government, it would seem to make little difference as a matter of
principle. For our courts to declare that acts taken by aliens in their
own country are illegal when the acts were required, called for, or
encouraged and regulated by their government is to imperil friendly
international relations.
International protests also arose from In the Matter of Grand
Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus.," in which a grand jury was
investigating the effect upon the commerce of the United States of
the shipping trade of foreign corporations between Mexican and
Japanese ports. The Department of State received diplomatic protests
from nine nations and transmitted them to the court.' As to the con-
97 Report, supra note 13, at 575.
98 1963 Trade Cas. t 70600, at 77456-57.
59 Restatement § 41.
60 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918), quoted and followed
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1964).
61 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960). Set text accompanying notes 114 and 115
infra.
62 Report of Fifty-First Conference, Int'l L. Ass'n 577-78 (Tokyo 1964).
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tention that the inquiry was improperly directed toward traffic not
involving American ports, the court noted that American cotton was
being shipped from Mexican ports, and that members of the congres-
sional subcommittee considered this violative of the Sherman Act, since
the foreign commerce of this country was clearly "affected.' The
court cited Alcoa as authority for the proposition that since traffic
by foreign carriers between Mexican and Japanese ports "affects"
American foreign commerce, questions under the Sherman Act might
be raised.
The decisions in these last two cases are subject to all the objec-
tions noted with respect to Alcoa. When the United States declares il-
legal a foreign contract between two foreign corporations, a contract
which related only to action to be taken abroad in countries where
it was perfectly legal, when it declares illegal arrangements made by
a foreign common carrier by water, for transportation between two
foreign ports, which arrangements were perfectly legal under the laws
of the State of registry of the ship and under those of the ports in-
volved, when it thus injects itself into affairs clearly within the juris-
diction of other States and of primary interest to them, it must surely
cause international protest, and ultimately retaliation.
E. Lanham Act Cases"
The Lanham Act provides that "any person who shall . . . in
commerce," infringe a registered trademark should be subject to the
liabilities provided; "commerce" is defined to include "all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress." 65 In Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co.," the defendant Steele, an American citizen, was charged
with infringing the plaintiff's trademark which was registered in the
United States but not in Mexico. Steele produced watches bearing the
plaintiff's trademark which Steele had registered in Mexico; these
watches were made and sold in Mexico. It was alleged that the de-
fendant's activities adversely affected the plaintiff's business in the
United States. The Supreme Court, however, did not, rely on the
"effects" doctrine but stated that "Congress in prescribing standards
of conduct for American citizens may project the impact of its laws
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.s 6 ' The Court
held that there was no conflict sufficient to support the argument that
relief would "impugn foreign law."
This case must be considered along with Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
63 186 F. Sapp. at 311-14.
94 See generally Oliver, Extraterritorial Application of United States Legislation
Against Restrictive or Unfair Trade Practices, 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 380 (1957).
65 60 Stat. 437, 443 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1127 (1964).
66 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
67 Id. at 282.
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F. Eaton Co." In Vanity Fair the defendant was a Canadian corpora-
tion which held a Canadian-registered trademark and was using it in
Canada. It was alleged that the mark infringed the plaintiff's mark
registered in the United States, and that, in the language of the
statute, its use "had a substantial effect on 'commerce which may law-
fully be regulated by Congress.'" The Second Circuit pointed out that
the case differed from Steele in two significant respects: the defendant
was a foreigner, and it had a duly registered trademark in the country
where the infringement took place." The judges felt "that the rationale
of the Court [in Steele] was so thoroughly based on the power of the
United States to govern 'the conduct of its own citizens . . . in foreign
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not
infringed,' that the absence of one of the above factors might well be
determinative and that the absence of both is certainly fatal.'
The court then dealt with the argument of "effect on our com-
merce"—the Alcoa principle. The act itself, the court said, gives
"almost no indication of the extent to which Congress intended to
exercise its power in this area"; there was, however, indication of
"Congressional regard for the basic principle of the International
Conventions, i.e., equal application to citizens and foreign nationals
alike of the territorial law of the place where the acts occurred." 7' It
was held that the act was not to be given "the extreme interpretation
urged upon us here." 72 To have held otherwise would obviously have
caused international complications, since an American court would
have held a Canadian corporation liable in damages for having used, in
Canada, a trademark which the Canadian Government had said could
be used by it; the court would also have issued an injunction prevent-
ing its future use by the corporation except at the risk of being found
in contempt of the American court. These decisions were a salutary
retreat from the extreme position of the antitrust cases and were
calculated to obviate the difficulties caused by those cases."
68 234 F.2d. 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
68 In Steele, Mexico had revoked the trademark before the Supreme Court heard
the case.
70 234 F.2d at 642-43.
71 Id. at 642.
72 Compare Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp.
594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 927 (1958). See Ebb, Regulation and Protection of International Business 384
(1964).
73 There have been other types of cases in which courts have refused to give our
statutes extraterritorial application to foreigners. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (Taft-Hartley Act) ; Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. Na-
tional Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.) (Railway Labor Act), cert. denied,
• 342 U.S. 849 (1951) ; Ferraioli v. Cantor, 1966 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 91615 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (Securities Exchange Act).
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F. Jones Act Cases
Two Supreme Court cases decided under the Jones Act are the
most helpful cases of all. The opinions in these cases develop a phil-
osophy and point out certain considerations that should guide all
decisions involving conflicting jurisdiction.
The Jones Act provides that "any seaman who shall suffer
personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election,
maintain an action for damages at law" with a jury trial instead of the
usual admiralty proceeding. 74 Lauritzen v. Larsen" posed the question
whether this procedure could be invoked by a Danish seaman who
was injured on a Danish ship while in a Cuban harbor. He contended
that the statute gave the right to "any seaman" and could be invoked
in a trial in this country. He further contended that there was a basis
for applying the American law in this case because of the frequent and
regular contacts of the ship with ports of the United States. Romero v.
Int'l Terminal Operating Co." raised a similar question, but the injury
was inflicted within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
In holding that the act could not be invoked in Lauritzen, the
Court used this very significant language:
If [the Jones Act be] read literally, Congress has conferred
an American right of action which requires nothing more than
that plaintiff be "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury
in the course of his employment."
. . .
While some [maritime statutes] have been specific in applica-
tion to foreign shipping and others in being confined to Amer-
ican shipping, many give no evidence that Congress addressed
itself to their foreign application, [leaving it] . . to be
judicially determined from context and circumstance. By
usage as old as the Nation, such statutes have been construed
to apply only to areas and transactions in which American
law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines
of international law.
. .
"[I] f any construction otherwise be possible, an Act will
not be construed as applying to foreigners in respect to acts
done by them outside the dominions of the sovereign power
enacting. That is a rule based on international law by
which one sovereign power is bound to respect the subjects
74 41 Stat. 1007
75 345 U.S. 571




46 U.S.C. § 688
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and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own
territory." Lord Russell of Killowen in The Queen v. Jame-
son, [1896] 2 Q.B. 425, 430. 77
In Romero, the Court disposed of the contention that the law of
the place of the injury should govern by pointing out that such a
rule "does not fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair
and prudent regard for the interests of foreign nations in the regula-
tion of their own ships and their own nationals, and the effect upon
our interests of our treatment of the legitimate interests of foreign
nations.' In this can be seen the basic philosophy behind the rule
that the law of the flag State should govern the internal affairs of a
ship in foreign waters, as well as the recognition of the need to respect
the legitimate interests of the foreign government in order that our
interests may be respected abroad. The latter consideration was
presented from a somewhat different angle in Lauritzen, where the
Court said:
[I] n dealing with international commerce we cannot be un-
mindful of the necessity for mutual forebearance if retalia-
tions are to be avoided; nor should we forget that any con-
tract which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our
law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a war-
rant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American
transaction."
A truly wise approach to the entire problem of exercise of con-
flicting international jurisdiction, stated as only Mr. Justice Frankfurter
could state it, appears in the Romero case: "The controlling considera-
tions are the interacting interests of the United States and of foreign
countries, and in assessing them we must move with the circumspec-
tion appropriate when this Court is adjudicating issues inevitably
entangled in the conduct of our international relations.""
III. USE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION TO COMPEL ACTION ABROAD
Discussion now focuses on an issue peculiarly within the compe-
tence of the judiciary or a regulatory agency. This is the problem
that arises when the court or agency has personal jurisdiction over a
party and uses its power to order the party to take certain action
abroad.
In the cases discussed up to this point, involving the extraterri-
torial applicability of our statutes, the court in some instances could
77 345 U.S. at 576-78.
78 358 U.S. at 384.
78 345 U.S. at 582.
80 358 U.S. at 383.
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be limited by the language of the statute itself, which, if specifically
framed to that end, could demand its extraterritorial application. In
the cases to be discussed in this section, the issue before the tribunal
was whether, and if so how, to exercise its power to enjoin or com-
mand future specific acts abroad by a party over whom it had personal
jurisdiction. Statutory language and legislative history, which a court
might feel required application of a statute to a specific fact situation,
do not dictate the details of judicial discretion in ordering future ac-
tion. Such orders can, and should, be tempered in the light of possible
international complications, hardship on private parties, and the
limits of practicality. Surprisingly, however, it is in this field of ad hoc
orders to take action abroad where the courts and regulatory agencies
have provoked the most serious diplomatic complaints and retaliative
action by the foreign governments whose sovereignty has been af-
fronted.
A. Extreme Antitrust Orders
The most notorious case, not only in this particular area, but also
in the whole field of the exercise of conflicting international jurisdiction,
was the case of United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd.' The
court had personal jurisdiction over the American defendant, Du Pont,
and over the British defendant, I.C.I. It found that Du Pont, I.C.I.
and others had violated our antitrust law by agreeing to divide the
territory of the world for purposes of selling nylon. Under the agree-
ment, Du Pont had assigned all British exploitation rights in its nylon
patents to I.C.I., which itself thereafter agreed to grant an exclusive
license to another British corporation, British Nylon Spinners, Ltd.
(Spinners), that was not within the jurisdiction of the American
court. The court felt that it had to end the allocation of territory to
maintain competition in world markets, and therefore that it had to
get Du Pont back into the nylon business in Great Britain. To accom-
plish this, the court ordered cancellation of the patent assignments
to I.C.I., and reversion of the British patent rights to Du Pont. This
would, of course, prevent I.C.I. from giving Spinners the exclusive
license as their contract required. Although the court ordered Du Pont
to make the patents generally available for licensing in Great Britain,
the effect of the order as a whole would be to destroy the exclusive
character of the patent rights which Spinners had secured by its con-
tract. The contract was legal and enforceable in England, where it
was made and to be performed. The American court order thus caused
Spinners hardship by depriving it of its rights without having had its
day in court, and by forcing Spinners to bring suit if it wished to
avoid the effect of the American court order. Of course, the order
81 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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simultaneously subjected I.C.I. to the probability of being sued by
Spinners.
Spinners did bring suit in England against I.C.I. and obtained
an injunction prohibiting that company from parting with the British
patents; the court also ordered specific performance of I.C.I.'s contract
to grant an exclusive license to Spinners." This left I.C.I. under the
order of an American court to take certain action, and under the
order of a British court prohibiting it from taking such action and
directing it to do what the American court had forbidden it to do.
There could be no clearer case of hardship on a private party,
were it not for the saving clause of the order of the American court:
No provision of this judgment shall operate -against [the de-
fendant] ... for action taken in compliance with any law .
of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof, to
which [the defendant] . . . is at the time being subject and
concerning matters over which under the law of the United
States such foreign government or instrumentality thereof
has jurisdiction. 83
While this may have at least partially protected I.C.I. from hardship, 84
it did not avoid the encroachment upon British sovereignty or the
resulting pointed comments of the British judges."
82 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch 19,
permanent injunction granted, [1955] 1 Ch. 37.
83 Quoted in [1953] 1 Ch. 19 at 24 n.4.
84 A better technique in this regard is found in the anti-cartel decrees in the oil
cases, which provided:
The injunctions ... shall not apply in the following cases:
(1) Where [the action is taken] . . . pursuant to requirement of law of
the foreign nation or nations within which [such action] .. . take[s]
place;
(2) Where [the action is taken] . . . pursuant to request or official
pronouncement of policy of the foreign nation or nations . . . and
where failure to comply with which request or policy would expose
[the defendant] . . . to the risk of present or future loss of the
particular business . . . which is the subject of such request or policy.
United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69849, at 77340 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). See similar decrees in United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69851
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Texaco, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. ¶ 70819 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). This form of decree has the advantage of specifically stating that it is not ap-
plicable when there is conflicting law, and thus avoids even the appearance of infringe-
ment on the sovereignty of the other state. Such a decree also recognizes that there
might be conflicting policy as well as law.
85 In British Nylon Spinners, the judge said that the plaintiff had established "a
prima fade case for saying that it is not competent for the courts of the United
States . .. to interfere with those rights or to make orders, observance of which by
our courts would require that our courts should not exercise the jurisdiction which they
have and which it is their duty to exercise in regard to those rights." [1953] 1 Ch.
at 26. The court, in that case, also observed that "the American court assumes juris-
diction in personam against a party amenable to its jurisdiction to compel it by contract
to modify the rights which the law of another confers on it in that other country [and
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Another consideration overlooked by the American court was
that it was ordering action to be taken by a foreign corporation in
the country of its incorporation and in which country another interested
party was located—a party which was not before the American court
and which was in a position to take action to frustrate the order. It
should have been apparent that the court was in no position to assure
the effectiveness of its order. It is demeaning as well as futile for a
court to issue an order that is bound to meet resistance and which
it has not the power to enforce.
In United States v. Holophane," the defendant, an American
corporation, was charged with having conspired with a British com-
pany and a French company, neither of which was before the court,
to divide the world market in specialty glass. Holophane, by agree-
ments entered into abroad, had agreed not to compete with the other
two in the areas allocated to them abroad, and it in turn was given
the American market. These agreements were found to be contrary
to our antitrust laws. The trial court ordered Holophane to terminate
its exclusive marketing agreements and directed it "to use reasonable
efforts . . . to promote the sale and distribution of [its] . . . products"
in the territories which the agreements assigned to the other two
companies. 87
The effect of the order in this case was precisely the same as
that in I.C.I. In both cases the party before the court was ordered to
act abroad in violation of its contract with a foreign party, a contract
that was legal where it was made and where it was to be performed.
Thus the court raised the possibility of a suit abroad with its attendant
hardships and conflicts. In both cases there was an exercise of juris-
diction in personam to attempt to extinguish or at least modify rights
of aliens abroad who were not before the court and whose rights would
seem to have depended on foreign law. Such use of jurisdiction in
personam was quite unwarranted. In both cases the court issued an
order which it was in no position to enforce abroad. In both cases the
court could have declared the contracts illegal under United States
law and thus established the liability of the American defendant in
this country. The foreign corporations would then have been free to
compete in the United States, if indeed it is the purpose of our anti-
trust laws to encourage foreign competition here.
thus would] . . . interfere with the municipal law of England." Id. at 21. Finally,
another comment is worth noting: "Applied conversely, I conceive that the American
courts would likewise be slow (to say the least) to recognize an assertion on the part
of the British courts of jurisdiction extending, in effect, to the business affairs of
persons and corporations in the United States." Id. at 24.
86 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). With regard to
the Holophane case, see Oliver, supra note 64; Note, 42 Cornell L.Q. 390 (1957).
87 1954 Trade Cas. ¶ 67679, at 69183 (S.D. Ohio 1954).
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B. Order to Produce Documents Located Abroad 88
An order to produce records from abroad obviously raises the
problem of conflicting jurisdictions if the State where the records are
located has a law or policy forbidding their removal from the State.
Such a local objection to removal usually stems from one of the three
basic causes. In the first place, the State may have a law prohibiting
the removal of certain records in which there is a public interest, such
as bank records. Second, there are some States, notably Switzerland,
which have a general policy prohibiting bank records and certain
corporate records from being examined without special permission of
the State. They could not be subpoenaed without such permission even
for use by a court in Switzerland. Third, the State may be funda-
mentally opposed to the substantive objective of the proceeding for
which the records are wanted because it feels the proceeding exceeds
American jurisdictional competence under international law, will result
in an infringement on that State's sovereignty, or is aimed at matters
which it considers of primary concern to itself and of little or no con-
cern to the United States. It therefore may refuse to permit records
to be taken out of its territory."
Whether one agrees with the laws and policies of these States or
not, one cannot ignore their position. An order for production of
records from abroad in a situation where such a conflict of law or
policy exists will most certainly result in international complications.
It is an order that can be enforced, if at all, only by contempt proceed-
ings, and it can easily become an unenforceable order if the other
State adheres to its law or policy.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to the
Canadian Int'l Paper Co.°° was a case in which a grand jury was in-
vestigating the newsprint industry in Canada to determine if there
were violations of the antitrust laws of this country. Canadian com-
panies were ordered to produce their records from Canada. There was
an immediate protest from the Canadian Government to the State De-
88 See generally Magnusson, The Need for International Agreement on Obtaining
Evidence from Foreign Countries, 26 Fed. B.J. 232 (1966); Note, Limitations on the
Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1441
(1963); Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdiction Where Law of
Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 295 (1962); Comment, Ordering Production
of Documents from Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 791 (1964).
89 The Legal Advisor of the Department of State commented in 1959 that
"there are a number of friendly foreign governments, foreign officials, and even
foreign courts, which believe strongly—or even passionately, I may say—that [it is]
. a violation [of international law] and infringement [of sovereignty]" to
apply our antitrust laws extraterritorially to foreigners. Address by Loftus E. Becker,
Antitrust Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, Jan. 29, 1959, reproduced
in 40 Dep't State Bull. 272-73 (1959).
90 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
696
CONCURRENT INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
partment." When this failed and contempt proceedings were threatened
for failure to comply with the order, the Government of Ontario took
steps to put its policy into law: it passed the Business Records Act,'
which barred the production of certain business records for use in
foreign courts. After this enactment, any further order by the Ameri-
can court would, of course, have been futile. The case illustrates the
extent to which the policy of a foreign country may be carried if we
persist in trying to concern ourselves with matters of primary concern
to a foreign jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court adopted a technique to overcome such a
difficulty. In Societe Internationale v. Rogers" (usually referred to
as the Interhandel case), the Attorney General held certain property
pursuant to the law relating to enemy-alien property, and the former
owner filed suit to reclaim the property, as permitted by the statute.
The contention of the government was that the corporation which had
owned the property (Interhandel), admittedly a Swiss corporation,
was in fact controlled by German interests, and therefore the property
was enemy property. Interhandel denied this. To prove its contention,
the government secured an order that Interhandel produce its records
from Switzerland for inspection. As already noted, the Swiss law is
perhaps the most strict in the western world regarding the inviolability
of corporate records, and they cannot be produced, much less taken
abroad, without the consent of the proper government official, which
in this case was not secured.
Although the Supreme Court held that it was error to nonsuit the
plaintiff for failure to comply with the order to produce the records,
it also pointed out that a failure to order their production "would
undermine congressional policies," for Congress had amended the
statute to reach enemy assets masquerading under "innocent fronts"
because of its "deep concern" with this problem. It held that the
production order was justified, that Interhandel could "plead with its
own sovereign for relaxation of penal laws or for adoption of plans
which will at the least achieve a significant measure of compliance
with the production order [and that it could be required] ... to make
all such efforts to the maximum of [its] ... ability....""' The Court
01 Report, supra note 62, at 565.
92 Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 44 (1960).
03 For other cases in which the policy was so strongly held that it was trans-
formed into law or government mandate when American court orders infringed on it, see
text accompanying notes 103, 118, and 119 infra. See also the reference to the Yugoslav
Criminal Code in Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 156
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
94 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
99 Id. at 205. This suggestion that the Swiss Government might be willing to
cooperate was particularly startling, for that Government had already championed the
cause of its national not only by diplomatic representations to our Department of
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justified its position by what it deemed was the mandate of an over-
riding congressional policy, and, of course, in such a situation, the
courts must follow where Congress leads. The Court expressly stated
that its decision should not be considered a governing precedent in
other cases where such an overriding policy was absent:
We do not say that this ruling would apply to every situa-
tion where a party is restricted by law from producing docu-
ments over which it is otherwise shown to have control. . . .
[W]e hold only that accommodation . . . to the policies
underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act justified the
action of the District Court in issuing this production order."
Unfortunately, however, the case has been treated as a governing
precedent by lower courts with no consideration of whether, in the
particular case, there was a congressional policy strong enough to
be deemed an overriding vital national interest."
The technique of Interhandel, though employed for the first time
by the Supreme Court in that case, was not wholly new. Six years
earlier, there was In re Investigation of World Arrangements," a
proceeding in which a grand jury was investigating alleged violations of
antitrust laws by the oil companies. Subpoenas were issued to foreign
corporations to produce their records from abroad. There was im-
mediate reaction from the companies and, in some cases, from govern-
ments. The defendants claimed that certain foreign governments
prohibited the removal of the required papers from their territory.
The court reserved its opinion on this point pending a showing that the
party concerned had in good faith attempted to get the consent of the
foreign government to remove the papers and had been refused. Evi-
dence was then introduced that the British Government controlled one
of the defendants and that it had directed the company officials, for
economic and security reasons, "not to produce any documents which
were not in the United States of America and which do not relate to
business in the United States ... without, in either case, the authority
of Her Majesty's Government."" The court construed this as a
claim of sovereign immunity and granted the claim.'"
State, but by bringing a suit against the United States in the International Court of
Justice, asking that we be enjoined from proceeding further in the matter. Interhandel
Case (Switzerland v. United States), [1959] I.C.J. 6.
90 357 U.S. at 205-06.
9T See note 126 infra.
98 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
99 Report, supra note 62, at 569-70. Pertinent extracts from correspondence, state-
ments by officials, debates in Parliament, etc. are reproduced id. at 569-73.
too 13 F.R.D. at 288-89.
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The grand jury proceeding was then considered at the highest
level of the United States Government, was discontinued,' and a
civil antitrust action was begun against the same defendants. Again the
government requested the production of documents "whether located
within or outside of the United States, including documents in the
files of subsidiaries." 102 Meanwhile, however, The Netherlands, follow-
ing a formal protest against a subpoena duces tecum issued to one of
its nationals in the grand jury proceeding, had enacted the Economic
Competition Act, which prohibited compliance with any "measures or
decisions" of a foreign State which related to restraints on competition
or to market control in The Netherlands." The court, faced with this
development, nevertheless ordered the production of all records re-
quested by the government, and required that the companies show
that they had, in good faith, tried to secure waivers of any limitations
imposed by foreign governments upon their removal.'" It should
be noted that here there was no consideration of whether there was
an overriding congressional policy which would support this Inter-
handel technique, although the case was decided almost six months
after the Interhandel decision.
It seems obvious that this approach can only result in interna-
tional repercussions detrimental to our best interests. An order such
as that in Interhandel asks a litigant to violate the law of another
State, or at least to use his best efforts to avoid its provisions. This
is hardly in the best judicial tradition, and better techniques must be
available.
Two tax suits brought by the Internal Revenue Service involved
the contention that production of bank records from Panama, as the
government was demanding, would be illegal under Panamanian law, 105
but in both cases the proof of the foreign law was faulty and the
courts ordered the records produced. In the first case, First Nat'l City
Bank v. Internal Revenue Serv., 106 the court said that, if shown to be
illegal, "the production . . . should not be ordered"; it further
directed that if it came to a question of contempt for failure to comply,
the trial court should "explore . . . the ability of the Bank to comply
101 Ebb, op. cit. supra note 72, at 307: "The Grand Jury was dismissed on the
Government's motion . . . after consultation with President, Cabinet officials, and with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
102 Ibid.
In Ibid.
I" United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 23 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
105 When there is a contention that compliance with a court order would violate
foreign law, the foreign law must be proved as an issue of fact. There seems to have
been an unexplained failure of such proof in a number of cases In both of the cases
being discussed here, the proof was faulty at the initial hearings.
106 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
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without subjecting its personnel to criminal sanctions under Pana-
manian law."'
The second case, Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 108
 in-
volved a rehearing at which further evidence of Panamanian law was
offered, and the illegality of removal of the records was shown. The
court then said that "the law appears to be clear that a Court should
not order any party to act in such a way that it would violate the laws
of a friendly foreign power.' 109
 Another solution was sought. The
court told the government that, with the cooperation of the bank, it
should try to get authority from the Panamanian courts to have the
documents copied for use in the American proceeding. An expert wit-
ness testifying on the law of Panama had said that he saw no reason
why the courts of Panama would not grant such a request. This dis-
position of the case was upheld on appeal.'
These cases demonstrate a much more preferable technique and
philosophy than Interhandel. Both subscribe to the doctrine that "a
Court should not order any party to act in such a way that it would
violate the laws of a friendly foreign power," and, as the appellate
court added in Chase Manhattan Bank, "just as we would expect and
require branches of foreign banks to abide by our laws applicable
to the conduct of their business in this country, so should we honor
their laws affecting our bank branches which are permitted to do
business in foreign countries.'""
Ings v. Ferguson' went even further. When it was contended
that the production of records from Canada would be illegal under
Canadian law, the court refused to order their production by a
Canadian bank.
Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our
courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not
take such action as may cause a violation of the laws of a
friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circum-
vention of its procedures. Whether removal of records from
Canada is prohibited is a question of Canadian law and is
best resolved by Canadian courts. tt3
The court ordered the subpoenas quashed and suggested the issuance
of letters rogatory to get the information, which would put the issue
of production of the records before a Canadian court. This seems a
107 Id. at 620.
128 191 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
10 492 F. Supp. 817, 818-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
110 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
111 Id. at 613.
112 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
113 Id. at 152.
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logical procedure designed to avoid the difficulties which have been
pointed out above. It deserves far more attention than it has been
given.
Orders to the shipping industry to produce records from abroad
have caused tremendous difficulties, still unresolved. In the Matter of
Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus. 114 involved the issu-
ance of such subpoenas to over 150 shipping firms. There were protests
by the defendants and by the embassies of Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden.'" The court said there could be no objection to producing
documents that were physically in the United States, and it so ordered,
but as to documents of foreign corporations located abroad, it reserved
its opinion until the matter had progressed enough to ascertain the
actual need for such an order. Temporizing is sometimes the best
means of dealing with difficult problems.
The shipping industry has had similar problems with the Federal
Maritime Board, now the Federal Maritime Commission. When the
industry was ordered to file copies of every contract, here or abroad,
relating to "commerce of the United States," eleven countries filed
diplomatic protests against the order.'" Two of the carriers brought
federal suits to enjoin its enforcement. 11 ' The outcome of these suits
was a determination that the Board had a legitimate interest in these
documents, even though located abroad; but before the production
order was compiled with and before further steps were taken, the
Board went out of existence.
When the Maritime Commission replaced the Board, certain mem-
bers of Congress unsuccessfully attempted to achieve the same goal
through legislation. The Commission, however, forced the issue by
calling upon carriers to produce documents from abroad. Protests
were received by the Department of State from the Governments
of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom,
asserting that such an order violated their respective jurisdictions, and
that they would have to restrain their nationals from compliance."'
Great Britain, indeed, enacted a statute which provided that if
114 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
115 Report, supra note 62, at 403-05, 577-78.
116 Id. at 578-82. The countries were Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain,
India, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.
117 Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Kerr S.S. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1960), judgment vacated,
369 U.S. 422 (1962).
118 3 Int'l Legal Materials 1129-32 (1964) (statement of Ass't Sec'y of State
Johnson).
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any person in the United Kingdom has been or may be re-
quired to produce or furnish to any court, tribunal or author-
ity of a foreign country any commercial document which is
not within the territorial jurisdiction of that country or any
commercial information to be compiled from documents not
within that jurisdiction; and ... the requirement constitutes
or would constitute an infringement of the jurisdiction which,
under international law, belongs to the United Kingdom,
[then certain specified Ministers of the Crown] ... may give
directions to that person prohibiting him from complying.
119. . .
Criminal penalties were included for noncompliance with any such
directions.
The entire matter thereafter was discussed in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and an agreed Minute
was issued by that organization and by the United States, in which
fourteen nations agreed to use their good offices to facilitate the
production of certain statistical information by their shipowners. The
United States agreed to consult with the other governments before
using the information in formal proceedings before the Commission.'"
These shipping cases involved policy differences between the
United States and the other major maritime countries as to whether
private shipping should be subject to governmental regulation. Fortu-
nately, the United States finally recognized that "in the case of both
our exports and our imports, there is a concurrent jurisdiction, which
we . . . are prepared to discuss." 121
 Recognition of this concurrent
jurisdiction is the key to an appropriate solution in such circumstances,
for a great deal of friction has been caused by the failure to appre-
ciate that there is concurrent jurisdiction, and to realize that the other
country will not stand idly by if it feels its sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion are infringed. Consideration of the issue in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, though leaving many prob-
lems still unsolved, has appropriately removed the resolution of the
basic policy differences from the realm of judicial and administrative
action to that of diplomacy. 122
1 19 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act of 1964, c. 87; 3 Int'l
Legal Materials 962-64 (1964). For a case which arose before passing of this statute,
see United States v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
120 52 Dep't State Bull. 188 (1965).
121 3 Int'l Legal Materials 1129 (1964) (statement of Ass't Sec'y of State Johnson).
122 See 52 Dep't State Bull. 549 (1965). For a discussion of the overall problem of
maritime "conference" rates and the present method of handling the matter, see Geren,
Diplomatic Adjustment by the Maritime Nations, 54 Dep't State Bull. 78 (1966).
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C. Order to Cause Action Abroad by Party Not Before Court
This section involves cases in which an American corporation, over
which the tribunal had personal jurisdiction, was ordered to compel
its foreign subsidiary, over which the tribunal had no jurisdiction, to
act in a manner contrary to the law or policy of the jurisdiction where
the subsidiary was located.
The first case involved a ruling by the United States Treasury
Department that its Foreign Assets Control Regulations were appli-
cable to foreign subsidiaries of American companies. Accordingly, the
Ford Motor Company felt compelled to order its Canadian subsidiary
not to consider the sale of vehicles to Communist China, although
Canadian policy was to promote such trade. This caused an immediate
reaction in Canada, and the Minister of Finance made the statement
that "Canadian law and Canadian law alone is to prevail over persons
or corporations carrying on business in Canada." The internal pres-
sures on the Canadian Government were so serious as a result of this
incident that President Eisenhower felt obliged to advert to the matter
in an address to the Canadian Parliament, saying that "although they
may raise questions in specific cases respecting control of an industry
by American citizens, these industries are, of course, subject to
Canadian law." The Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition
in Canada both publicly hailed this statement as an assurance that
Canadian sovereignty in the matter was now admitted, but the
United States Treasury still claims the right to control such acts of
subsidiaries 123
Ambassador Merchant of the United States and Ambassador
Heeney of Canada, designated as a working group by President
Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson, were charged with reporting
on a number of problems between the two countries. In their report
of June 28, 1965, they strongly recommended "that the two govern-
ments examine promptly the means, through issuance by the United
States of a general license or adoption of other appropriate measures,
by which this irritant to our relationship may be removed, without
encouraging the evasion of United States law by citizens of the United
States." 124 The diplomatic approach was properly invoked and should
be pursued further in this type of situation. The order of the Treasury
Department was quite inappropriate. It did not, of course, apply to
the Canadian subsidiary, but it did apply to the parent company here;
thus, the United States, by use of its power over the parent, sought to
control the actions of the subsidiary abroad. In short, personal juris-
123 Ebb, op. cit. supra note 72, at 113-14. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, .329(a)(4)
(1967).
124 53 Dep't State Bull. 193, 202 (1965).
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diction was employed to govern a situation in Canada over which we
had no legislative jurisdiction, and to cause action to be taken there
which contravened official Canadian policy.
The Canadian position was made clear in a statement by its
Minister of Justice and Attorney General, although made in connec-
tion with a different proceeding:
Our objections to an action such as this are three-fold:
That it is concerned not so much with a strict compliance
with United States laws in the United States as it is concerned
with actions in Canada of Canadian companies which actions
are in accord with Canadian laws and Canadian commercial
policy; that compliance . . . may bring these companies in
Canada into conflict with Canadian laws and policy; and
thirdly that the only way effect could be given to such [regu-
lations] is if American directors of United States companies
give instructions to directors of Canadian companies to do
something in Canada which is not in accord with Canadian
business or commercial policy but is dictated by American
policy. Nothing could more clearly illustrate the objection-
ably extraterritorial effect of the action taken. . . . The
situation, as it strikes us, can be put this way: that these
cases reach into affairs that we regard as relating to our
sovereignty. These cases involve on the part of the United
States more interference, and apparent assertion of a right to
interfere, in commercial projects in Canada than is fitting or
acceptable between two friendly but independent countries.'
This case may have involved a factor of overriding vital national
interest which justified the action taken."' Our Government may have
125 Remarks of E. Davie Fulton, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada, regarding an analogous technique in the antitrust proceedings against the so-
called "Canadian patent pool," CCH Antitrust Law Symposium 39, 46-47 (1959).
120 The term "overriding vital national interest" is difficult to define. According
to Restatement § 40, comment b, "vital national interest" means "an interest such as
national security or general welfare to which a state attaches overriding importance."
However, "general welfare" suggests certain current legislative programs which would
hardly qualify as overriding vital national interests. If they are to override all other
considerations and control, even if it means infringing the jurisdiction of another
friendly sovereign and perhaps violating the law of nations, they must rise at least
to the national security level. To illustrate, while there is a strong national policy
favoring strict enforcement of the antitrust laws in this country, this is a very different
thing from saying that there is an overriding vital national interest in their enforce-
ment that demands exertion of our power to this end against foreign nationals for acts
done in foreign countries, even though it means impairment of our international rela-
tions and imposition of private hardships. On the other hand, the national policy, in
agreement with our Allies, of obtaining our reparations from our World War II enemies
by seizing and applying to our claim the assets of enemy nationals that were found in
this country might well qualify, and indeed was regarded as an overriding vital national
interest in the Interhandel case. See text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
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felt that all shipments of automotive material to Communist China
had to be stopped at any cost. If that was the case, the better technique
would have been to have initiated the discussions between the two coun-
tries at the outset.
The latest case in this field, United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank,12' involved a jeopardy assessment for federal income taxes
allegedly due from Omar, S.A., a Uruguayan corporation. Although
the income involved was received here, Omar had since withdrawn from
the United States and transferred its monies to the Montevideo
branch of the First National City Bank of New York (Citibank). The
branch, though not a separate corporation, was a "separate entity"
under New York law. Pending personal service on Omar, the govern-
ment asked that the funds held by Citibank for Omar in Montevideo
be frozen. Service, for this purpose, was made on Citibank in New York.
The district court ordered the freezing on the theory of an attach-
ment.' 28 Under New York law, however, accounts in foreign branches
were not collectible at the New York office unless the foreign branch
had breached its contract by refusing payment. The court of appeals
held that under these circumstances the Montevideo account of Omar
was not within the jurisdiction of the New York federal court. Citi-
bank was liable to Omar only at Montevideo, and there was nothing
in New York to be reached by the attachment. "Absent an explicit
indication to the contrary, there should not be attributed to Congress
an intent to give the courts of this nation, in this highly sensitive area
of intergovernmental relations, the power to affect rights to property
wherever located in the world." 12°
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the New York
headquarters of Citibank admittedly could give orders to the Monte-
video branch, it was appropriate for the district court to order the
New York headquarters to have its branch hold the monies due Omar
"pending service of process on Omar and an adjudication of the
merits.""° New York law provided that personal jurisdiction might be
exercised over a nondomiciliary who was outside the jurisdiction if he
had transacted any business in the state and the cause of action arose
therefrom. There was provision for out-of-state service of process in
such a case."' Personal service on Omar had not been obtained at the
time of the hearing.
A dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice
127 379 U.S. 378 (1965). For a criticism of this case, see Keeffe, Practicing Lawyers'
Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 51 A.B.A.J. 594 (1965).
128 United States v. Omar, S.A., 210 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
129 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir.), aff'd en
bane, 325 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1963).
138 379 U.S. at 385.
131 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §1 302(a), 313 (McKinney 1963).
705
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Goldberg, is directly in point. After noting that "the Court does not
decide the quasi in rem issue on which the District Court relied," the
dissent proceeded:
The Court upholds the freeze order on the basis that the
District Court, pending acquisition of personal jurisdiction
over Omar, had authority to enjoin Citibank (over which it
did have personal jurisdiction) from allowing its Montevideo
branch to transfer the funds to Omar.
There can be no doubt that the enforcement powers
available to the District Court were adequate to accomplish
that much of the end in view . . . . But "jurisdiction" is not
synonymous with naked power. It is a combination of power
and policy....
The real problem with this phase of the case is therefore
this: Granting that the District Court had the naked power
to control the Montevideo account by bringing to bear
coercive action on Citibank, ought the court to have exercised
it? Or to put the question in the statutory terms, was the
court's order "appropriate" for the enforcement of the in-
ternal revenue laws? 132
The opinion further noted that Omar's property "has been taken from
its control by a court having jurisdiction neither over the corporation
nor over the property. . . ." 1" It then proceeded to deal with the pro-
priety of the freeze order, pointing out that unless funds to pay
the government's claim could be realized, the freeze should not be
ordered.
The government contended that, acting under the New York
statute, personal jurisdiction could be obtained over Omar, judgment
could be rendered, and an order entered to pay the judgment from the
funds in Montevideo. It was contended that, if this failed to get the
funds, a court officer could be sent to Montevideo to make a direct
demand on the bank. If the branch failed to release the funds, this
would make the debt payable in New York, where it could be gar-
nished. But the dissent pointed out that in international practice, States
do not recognize tax judgments of foreign courts, and it would
probably be improper for the branch of Citibank to pay the judgment.
If this were so, the debt could not be garnished and the freeze order
would have been issued improperly. Furthermore, Citibank, "an inno-
cent stakeholder," would be put to undue hardship, and should have
doubts resolved in its favor. "It would subject Citibank to the possi-
bility of double liability if Uruguay did not recognize the United
132 379 U.S. at 387-88.
133 Id. at 392.
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States' judgment, and multiple liability if Uruguay permitted actions
for slander of credit."' If the law of Uruguay was unclear, only a
suit for the deposit could determine the issue, and
it may be impossible for Citibank to establish Uruguayan law
before it is too late. If the Government manages to levy on the
account, and only afterwards is it established that the bank
was liable to Omar, Citibank would be left to sue the United
States for recoupment, an eventuality for which no provision
has been made and which the Government stated at the
oral argument of this case that it would oppose.'
The dissent also noted that problems between states of the Union
are different from those between two nations, and it noted the possible
danger of reciprocal treatment or retaliation by the other nation. It
stated:
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that our
modern notions of substituted service and personal jurisdic-
tion were developed within a framework of States whose
various processes are governed by the Due Process Clause
and whose judgments must be given full faith and credit by
the other States within the federal structure. Great care and
reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of
personal jurisdiction into the international field, both as a
basis for asserting federal judicial power with respect to
property in foreign countries and for permitting property in
this country to be tied up by foreign courts 136
It seems regrettable that this most recent pronouncement by the
Supreme Court supports a view of the exercise of congressional and
judicial jurisdiction which extends to the limits of congressional and
judicial power, and thus harks back to Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Con-
nell , i87 if, indeed, it does not substitute altogether power for jurisdic-
tion. Although the courts had personal jurisdiction over Citibank, there
was no jurisdiction at all to affect the contractual relationship between
Omar and the Uruguayan branch of Citibank, a "separate entity" in
Montevideo. The distinction between personal jurisdiction of a tribunal
over a party and legislative or judicial jurisdiction over an act or
situation abroad, should be scrupulously maintained. It is unwise if not
improper to seek to accomplish by indirection what is forbidden and
impossible by direct action. Furthermore, as Mr. Justice Harlan
134 Id. at 401-02.
135 Ibid.
136 Id. at 403-04.
137 335 U.S. 377 (1948). See pp. 678-80 supra.
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pointed out, it would very probably be a violation of the legal obliga-
tion of the branch of Citibank under Uruguayan law to pay the tax
judgment.
IV. BASIC CAUSES OF IMPROPER OR UNWISE
EXERCISE OF CONFLICTING JURISDICTION
In the light of the foregoing, it is suggested that three basic cir-
cumstances probably combine to account for much of the trouble that
has been encountered in the exercise of conflicting international juris-
diction.
First: The most basic difficulty seems to have been a failure to
recognize the problem or, if it was recognized, to appreciate its signifi-
cance and ramifications. The legislative, judicial, and executive
branches of the Government (save the Department of State and a few
relatively small groups) have all been concerned, by and large, with
domestic affairs. Their thinking is conditioned to deal with matters
that are wholly within the territorial confines of the United States,
where they have full authority to make, interpret, or enforce the law
that will govern the situation. Domestic issues of conflicting juris-
diction are presented in the context of conflicts between the laws of the
states of the Union, and in the framework of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution, the substantially uniform jurisprudence
and the similar policies of the states involved, and the common sover-
eignty of the United States of America. An issue of possible conflict
with the law or policy of a foreign jurisdiction, however, involves the
recognition of the sovereignty of that other State, its independence
of and equality with all other sovereignties including our own, its
different laws, policies, and concepts of jurisprudence, and its right and
ability to control persons and matters within its own territory.
Relatively few judges are trained or experienced in international
law, and it is not easy for judges to think in terms of issues and condi-
tions with which they are unfamiliar, particularly when the case
appears to present a situation very much like those in the domestic
field with which they are familiar. Furthermore, counsel selected for
their competency in, let us say, the field of antitrust law are frequently
not fully competent in the field of international law. Certain of the
decisions which indicate a failure to comprehend the problems in the
area of conflicting international jurisdiction are probably the result
of counsel's failure to present the matter properly to the court, intro-
duction of dubious points, admissions which eliminate the ground on
which a position should have been taken, or other confusion of the
pertinent issues.
Second: On certain occasions there seems to have been confusion
between jurisdiction in personam over a party before a tribunal and
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jurisdiction over an act committed abroad or over subject matter
located abroad. Our doctrines •regarding jurisdiction in personam
(which have in recent years undergone a marked liberalization) should
not be invoked to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the act or
subject matter. A clear expression of the basis of jurisdiction over the
foreign subject matter in each case where extraterritorial application
of a statute or order is involved would be an excellent way to channel
such application in an appropriate direction and to subject it to wise
limitations.
Third: A fundamental rule of statutory construction has too
often been disregarded. It is not arbitrary, but is based upon the
soundest assessment of the nature of the problem we are discussing.
"All legislation is prima facie territorial."' Too frequently, especially
in the antitrust field, the approach has been that of Vermilya-Brown:
"[1]t is difficult to formulate a boundary to [the] . . . coverage [of
a statute] short of areas over which the power of Congress extends.
. . As has been pointed out above, Congress seldom focuses
on the issue of the extent of geographical coverage of a statute. That
body deals primarily with situations within the United States. When
a statute is intended to apply extraterritorially, it is almost always
made clear in the language of the statute. Therefore, as Foley Bros.
stated, "The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . is a valid
approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascer-
tained." 140
This rule is applicable, in slightly modified form, to cases involv-
ing the imposition of our laws upon foreign merchant ships in our ports.
Unless the peace of the port is disturbed, the ship should be treated,
in respect to matters pertaining to its internal affairs, its crew, and
its passengers, as if it were the territory of the State whose flag it
flies. In such situations our legislation is prima facie to be applied
only to our own territory, not to this quasi-territory of a foreign State.
V. CONCLUSION: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
TO THE EXERCISE OF CONFLICTING JURISDICTION
What should be the approach to the problem of how to exercise
one's jurisdiction when such exercise may conflict with the jurisdiction
of another sovereign? What considerations should be taken into ac-
count and weighed by a governmental body, be it executive, legislative,
138 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
139 Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, supra note 137, at 389.
119 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
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or judicial, which is faced with the question of whether, and how, to
exercise its jurisdiction in such circumstances? -
Apart from cases in which a vital national interest demands cer-
tain action even though it may infringe upon another sovereign, impair
our foreign relations, and cause hardship to private parties, the decision
maker, in addition to considering statutory language and policy, should
weigh the following considerations.
1. The three basic causes of improper or unwise exercise of con-
flicting jurisdiction, mentioned above, should, of course, be borne in
mind.
2. The possible effect of the proposed action upon the other
sovereign and upon our foreign relations should be considered. The
decision shoud be framed in the light of the position taken by the other
sovereign, its vital national interests, laws, policies and customs, and
its interest in its own nationals. Any infringement of strong public
policies and ancient customs of the other State, whether or not enacted
into law, will most certainly cause a reaction from the other govern-
ment. Basic policy differences should be dealt with through diplomatic
channels. Attempts to deal with matters which reasonably are thought
by the foreign sovereign to be its primary concern likewise will cause
a reaction. Not only should one avoid ordering acts to be taken in a
foreign country which would be illegal under its law, but every effort
should be made to avoid treating as illegal those acts of citizens of the
foreign State committed within its borders and legal under its law,
particularly when they have the encouragement of the foreign sover-
eign.
3. Another point that must be considered, although it will usually
arise only in connection with a court order, is the possibility of hard-
ship on some private party. Hardships may range from a minor incon-
venience to a severe criminal penalty, but if there is any reasonable
way to avoid it, no should be placed in the position of being under
different and conflicting requirements of two States, each of which
may be able to enforce its own order. In addition, the court should
take great care not to adversely affect the rights of a party not before
it.
4. Consideration should be given to the ability of the issuing
authority to make its order effective. It is injudicious and futile to issue
an order which will probably meet resistance and cannot be enforced.
Furthermore, the manner in which an order might have to be enforced
may reflect the inadvisability of issuing it in the first place: if it can
be enforced only by action which will produce consequences that are
even more undesirable than the failure to issue the order, it clearly
should not be issued.
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5. Finally, perhaps the best test of all is to consider what this
country's reaction would be if another State issued the same order
against us or one of our nationals. We therefore should act toward
the other State as we want and expect it to act in dealing with us."'
Are we prepared to have our position established as a sound jurisdic-
tional doctrine and an example of a wise exercise of discretion?
The present Undersecretary of State, former Attorney General
of the United States, writing as a professor of law, said in 1956:
"Within the world community . . . the fact that formal power is dis-
tributed geographically, rather than functionally, makes necessary
mutual assistance and reciprocal self-restraint in its exercise." 142 This
is the underlying philosophy of all that has been said above. Reflection
upon this political fact, and an appreciation of the related principle of
governmental operation which inevitably follows therefrom, will lay
the basis for avoiding, or at least mitigating, the complications that
have heretofore developed in our exercise of jurisdiction when it con-
flicted with that of another sovereign. Self-restraint is the key to the
satisfactory handling of the situation. The considerations to be
borne in mind when dealing with such a problem will be of no value
unless the governmental body which is to make the decision is prepared
to exercise appropriate self-restraint, and not carry its action to
lengths that will be counter-productive. It is a question of balancing
the various considerations, and exercising discretion wisely and judi-
ciously.
141 "We do justice that justice may be done in return." Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258, 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923).
142 Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances
in Interstate and International Law, 65 Yale L.J. 1087, 1110 (1956).
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